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Perhaps the most significant statutory change during the survey period
in family law relating to child custody was enacted by the Congress of the
United States. Popularly known as the Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act (PKPA), the Act provides very little in the way of kidnapping preven-
tion; it does attempt, however, to provide for a uniform system of child
custody jurisdiction.' The PKPA does not directly enact the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA),2 but instead defers to state sov-
ereignty by expanding the concept of full faith and credit. A new section,
entitled Full Faith and Credit Given to Child Custody Determinations,3 is
added to the full faith and credit statute by the PKPA.4 Apparently, the
PKPA was intended to further uniformity in the interpretation of continu-
ing jurisdiction throughout the United States by creating an incentive for
all states to enact the UCCJA.5 Unfortunately, the interpretation of the
UCCJA has not been uniform, so that in any particular case each state's
law will have to be examined before any determination can be made as to
which state has jurisdiction.6 Texas lawyers should be aware that Texas
* A.B., Oberlin College; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Professor of Law,
Southern Methodist University.
1. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 6-10, 94 Stat.
3568-73 (1980) (to be codified in scattered sections of titles 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). Section 7
describes the purpose of the Act. 94 Stat. at 3568. Section 8 provides that a state must give
full faith and credit to another state's child custody determinations when criteria set out in
the section are met. 94 Stat. at 3569. Section 9 provides for the use of the Federal Parent
Locator Service to help find any absent parent or child in connection with the settling of a
child custody dispute. 94 Stat. at 3571. Section 10 attempts to clarify congressional intent
that the Fugitive Felon Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1976), apply to parental kidnapping. 94 Stat.
at 3573.
2. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §§ 1-28. For the various state
amendments to each section, see id, reprinted in 9 U.L.A. 116 (1979 & Supp. 1981).
3. Pub. L. No. 96-911, § 8, 94 Stat. 3569 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
5. This may not have been necessary, since only Massachusetts, Mississsippi, South
Carolina, Texas, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have not
enacted the UCCJA. In Murphy v. Murphy, 404 N.E.2d 69 (Mass. 1980), Massachusetts
judicially adopted rules similar to the UCCJA, and Texas has had rules similar to the
UCCJA through its Family Code. See TEx. FAM. CODE A'Nw. §§ 11.01-.06 (Vernon 1975).
6. Uniformity of interpretation is important because the PKPA appears to rely on a
state's own definition of its jurisdiction instead of external objective criteria. While this
survey cannot discuss the vanous interpretations of UCCJA jurisdiction, some of the follow-
ing articles might be helpful: Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody.- Initial and Continuing Juris-
diction Under the UCCIA, 14 FAM. L.Q. 203 (1981); Sampson, What's Wrong with the
UCCJA?, 3 FAM. ADVOCATE 28 (1981). In addition, two decisions by Oregon's Supreme
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law alone may not answer the question of which state has jurisdiction over
a particular child custody case.7 Because the PKPA became effective on
July 1, 1981, no court decisions to date have interpreted it.
In its 67th session, the Texas Legislature made a number of routine
changes in the wording of various sections of the Family Code, as well as
some significant substantive changes. One of the changes was the increase
in the length of the statute of limitations in paternity suits from one year to
four yearsA This change may or may not be final because both the United
States Supreme Court9 and the Texas Supreme Court' 0 have pending
before them constitutional challenges to the original one year statute of
limitations. If either court should rule that minority must toll any statute
relating to a minor's paternity, the statute will have to be altered.
In the interest of clarity and in response to the experiences of persons
using the Family Code, the legislature revised chapter 11, the procedural
chapter of the parent and child section of the Code. Section 11.06 on
transfers of proceedings, has been clarified. I I Section 11.10, which con-
cerns guardians ad litem, now provides for the payment of the guardian ad
litem by the county when the state seeks to terminate the parent-child rela-
tionship.' 2 In addition to being revised and clarified, section 11.11,13 on
temporary orders, now provides for the awarding of attorney's fees in con-
nection with temporary orders.' 4 Section 11.13 was revised to clarify fur-
ther the role of the court and the jury,15 and section 11.18, on costs, now
clearly permits the awarding of attorney's fees with respect to all parent-
child proceedings.16
Chapter 12,17 on the parent-child relationship, was not amended, and
chapter 13,18 on paternity, was left substantially unchanged, with the ex-
Court that indicate a changing view of the UCCJA are worth comparing: Grubs v. Ross,
291 Or. 263, 630 P.2d 353 (1981); Settle v. Settle, 276 Or. 759, 556 P.2d 962 (1975).
7. Not only must original jurisdiction be in conformity with the PKPA, but continuing
jurisdiction depends on the original state's view of its continuing jurisdiction. Pub. L. No.
96-611, § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3570 (1980) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d)). Thus, the provi-
sions of § 14.10 of the Texas Family Code may need to be interpreted in light of the other
states' jurisdictional viewpoints. If a state's law holds that it has continuing jurisdiction so
long as one of the parties to the original decree remains within that state, then, despite the
so-called six-month rule of § 14.10(b)(2), a Texas court might not have jurisdiction. See
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
8. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
9. Texas ex rel. A.B.D. v. Habluetzel, No. 1547 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi Jan.
31, 1980, writ ref d), prob. uris. noted, 451 U.S. 936 (1981). The Supreme Court recently
heard arguments on Mills v. Habluetzel. 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2162 (Jan. 12, 1982).
10. In re Miller, 605 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980), writ granted sub
nom. In re J.A.M., 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 202 (Jan. 31, 1981).
11. All the subsections of this section have been revised, and the number of subsections
has been increased. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.06 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
12. Id § 11.10(e).
13. All the subsections of this section have been revised. Id § 11.11.
14. Id § 1l.ll(a)(5).
15. All the subsections of this section have been revised. Id § 11.13.
16. Id § 11.18(a).
17. Id §§ 12.01-.05 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1982).
18. Id §§ 13.01-.09, 13.21-.24, 13.41-.43.
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ception of the change in the statute of limitations mentioned above. 19 Sec-
tion 14.04 was also reorganized, clarifying that a possessory conservator
can be granted as many decisional rights as a managing conservator, even
though the child may be living with the managing conservator. 20 A new
section that addresses the problem of probation for persons found in con-
tempt for arrearages in child support payments was added to chapter 14.21
The new section allows the courts greater flexibility in fashioning remedies
for nonsupport.
Two essential procedural amendments were made to chapter 15. One of
these provides a statutory basis for terminating the legal rights of a man
who has executed an affidavit of a waiver of interest in a child. 22 Hereto-
fore the status of such a man has been anomalous. Because he is neither a
parent nor a father, he seemingly has no rights that can be terminated. He
is, or might be, connected with the child, however, or he would not have
been involved in litigation. The addition to the Family Code attempts to
dispose of any rights or any potential rights such a man might have. The
other amendment to chapter 15 changes the procedure for dismissal of a
termination petition. No longer are all parties required to agree to dismis-
sal; instead, only the court has to approve.23 The court is required to con-
sider the best interests of the child in all matters brought to its attention
pertaining to the child 24 and this should be a sufficient safeguard against
improper dismissals.
The legislature extensively changed chapter 21, the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act (URESA).25 The confusion caused by inte-
grating the Texas rules of continuing jurisdiction26 into URESA had been
evident for some time, and the many amendments to this chapter attempt
to make URESA a freestanding remedy. One change in URESA is that
the definition of duty of support has been expanded to include explicitly
all varieties of court recognized fathers.27 Additionally, changes were
made in the rules concerning the admissibility of evidence in URESA
litigation.28
The limit on parental liability for damage caused by the wilful and mali-
cious conduct of their children was tripled, raising the ceiling to $15,000.29
In addition, all references in the Family Code to the State Department of
Public Welfare now reflect the department's new name, the Texas Depart-
ment of Human Resources. This summary does not attempt to include all
19. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
20. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.04 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
21. Id § 14.12.
22. Id § 15.041(e).
23. Id § 15.06.
24. Id. § 14.07 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1982).
25. Id §§ 21.03(6), .04, .08, .24, .25, .26, .28, .31, .32(a), .35, .36, .45 (Vernon Supp.
1982).
26. Id §§ 11.05, .052, .071.
27. Id § 21.03(6).
28. Id § 21.36.
29. Id § 33.02.
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the child related statutory changes made by the 67th Texas Legislature.
The Probate Code, the Education Code, and the Human Resources Code,
among others, also reflect changes that relate to children.
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
During the past year, the United States Supreme Court was again active
in making decisions concerning the parent-child relationship. In Little v.
Streater the Court held that when the state is a party in a suit to establish
paternity, and the alleged indigent father has the burden of denying pater-
nity, it is a denial of due process for the state not to provide for the cost of
blood grouping tests.30 The Texas Legislature seems to have reached a
similar conclusion; when the legislature enacted the Texas paternity statute
in 1975, it provided that the courts could require that costs of blood group-
ing tests be borne by the Texas Department of Human Resources. 3' Little,
however, does not appear to be useful in forecasting the Court's attitude on
statutes of limitations for paternity suits. 32 The Court's holding turned on
the injustice of saddling a man with paternal responsibility when it was in
fact not his responsibility, rather than on the need or perhaps the right of a
child to know accurately the identity of his father.
Webb v. Webb 33 involved the interpretation of the UCCJA. The
Supreme Court avoided the issue of the application of the constitutional
requirement of full faith and credit 34 to child custody judgments on the
basis that this case concerned state statutory law and not the federal Con-
stitution. There being no federal question, therefore, the Court declined to
intervene. Furthermore, the Court found that the federal full faith and
credit issue had not been raised properly below, and so held there was no
basis for deciding the issue.35 This result is probably a good one, because
the PKPA36 had not yet been passed when Webb was decided. The Court
now will have an opportunity to decide the entire question of full faith and
credit in relation to child custody under the PKPA. This question is highly
complicated, and the states need an opportunity to clarify the issues before
the United States Supreme Court settles the matter.
In Jones v. Helms,37 a habeas corpus case, the father had wilfully aban-
doned his child and left the state. Under Georgia law such action was a
felony; had he not left the state, however, it would have been merely a
misdemeanor.38 The father claimed that the statutory classification vio-
30. 101 S. Ct. 2202, 2211, 68 L. Ed. 2d 627, 639 (1981).
31. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.03(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
32. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
33. 101 S. Ct. 1889, 68 L. Ed. 2d 392 (1981).
34. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State."
35. 101 S. Ct. at 1894, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 400.
36. For a discussion of the provision of the PKPA, see notes 1-4 supra and accompany-
ing text.
37. 101 S. Ct. 2434, 69 L. Ed. 2d 118 (1981).
38. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-9902 (1981).
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lated his equal protection rights under the United States Constitution.39
He also claimed that the classification violated the privileges and immuni-
ties clause40 by denying him the right to travel. The Court found no merit
in either argument, 4' and held that a person's own misconduct can qualify
his right to travel.42 Furthermore, the Court held that enforcing the paren-
tal support obligation is so important that the difficulty of extraterritorial
enforcement justifies enhancing the crime of abandonment from a misde-
meanor to a felony.43 Having found no impermissible infringement of the
right to travel, the Court could find no equal protection violation. The
case is particularly interesting because the Court found a legitimate state
interest in having parents support their children.
The state's interest in the obligation of parents to support their children,
however, was not considered sufficient to allow state law to prevail over
federal law in Ridgway v. Ridgway.4  A serviceman, insured under the
Serviceman's Group Life Insurance Act (SGLIA),45 was the divorced fa-
ther of three children. The divorce judgment contained a negotiated prop-
erty settlement that ordered him to keep his life insurance policies in force
for the benefit of his three children. Four months after the divorce he
remarried, and six days later he changed the beneficiary designation of his
SGLIA policy, directing that the proceeds be paid according to law.
Under the provisions of the SGLIA, such a designation meant that the
proceeds would go to his widow, his second wife. After his death, his first
wife under the terms of the divorce decree claimed the proceeds on behalf
of the children, while the second wife claimed the proceeds as the desig-
nated beneficiary. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine imposed a con-
structive trust in favor of the children on the proceeds of the policy, and
ordered payment accordingly. 46
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that such an action
was in contravention of the supremacy clause,47 because Congress in-
tended that SGLIA proceeds go only to the beneficiaries designated in
writing by the serviceman. 48 The Court further found that imposition of a
constructive trust on the proceeds was inconsistent with the antiattachment
provisions of the SGLIA.49 Yiatchos v. Yiatchos,50 which involved a
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I provides: "No State shall... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws."
40. Id art. IV, § 2 provides: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privi-
leges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
41. 101 S. Ct. at 2442, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 128.
42. Id. at 2440-41, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 125-26.
43. Id. at 2441-42, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 127-28.
44. 102 S. Ct. 49, 59, 70 L. Ed. 2d 39, 53 (1981).
45. 38 U.S.C. §§ 765-770 (1980).
46. Ridgway v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 419 A.2d 1030, 1035 (Me. 1980).
47. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 provides: "The Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land."
48. 102 S. Ct. at 55, 70 L. Ed. 2d at 47-48.
49. Id at 57-58, 70 L. Ed. 2d at 51.
50. 376 U.S. 306 (1964).
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fraudulent attempt to divest a wife of any interest in her property, was
distinguished from Ridgway. The Court noted that in Ridgway the first
wife had not alleged fraud in the lower courts, and she did not have a
vested right in the proceeds, because ,only her former husband had the
power to create or change beneficiaries. 5 Ridgway's actions were found to
be "nothing more than a breach of contract. '52
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented vigorously, dis-
puting the finding of a lack of fraudulent intent.5 3 Justice Stevens, in a
separate dissenting opinion, argued that the imposition of a constructive
trust in this case would not damage any substantial federal interest.54 No-
tably lacking in the discussion by all members of the Court is the question
of res judicata. If Ridgway was dissatisfied with the restrictions imposed
by the divorce court he could have appealed its decree, and seemingly, he
alone should have had standing to raise the question of federal preemp-
tion. Possibly a negotiated settlement of child support was not considered
a final judgment, but it is odd that the question of res judicata was never
addressed by the Court.55
The right of indigent parents to counsel when the state is attempting to
terminate their parental rights has been of concern for some time.56 Texas
does not provide counsel for parents in such circumstances, although it
does provide for the appointment and payment of a guardian ad litem for
their children.57 The question of the parent's right to counsel was before
the Court in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,58 and a divided
Court held that no absolute right to counsel existed because a loss of lib-
erty was not involved.59 The Court stated that a case by case balancing of
interests was required.60 In Lassiter no expert witnesses testified, no troub-
lesome points of law arose, no allegations of criminal conduct were made,
and the weight of the evidence was such that the presence of an attorney
would not have made a dispositive difference. The Court therefore found
no denial of due process.61 The Court added that its opinion did not imply
that the statutory standards of thirty-three states and the District of Co-
lumbia requiring the appointment of counsel "are other than enlightened
and wise."'62
51. 102 S. Ct. at 56-57, 70 L. Ed. 2d at 50.
52. Id at 57, 70 L. Ed. 2d at 50.
53. Id at 59-63, 70 L. Ed. 2d at 53-58.
54. Id at 63-68, 70 L. Ed. 2d at 58-64.
55. In similar cases involving private insurance, Texas courts have used the constructive
trust device in order to protect the rights of the decedent's children. Tomlinson v. Lackey,
555 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no writ); Wunsche v. Equitable Life Assur-
ance Soc'y, 551 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.); see Solender,
Family Law.- Parent and Child, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 141, 156 (1978).
56. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Servs., 101 S. Ct. 2153, 2166 n.6, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640,
652 n.6 (1981).
57. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.10 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
58. 101 S. Ct. 2153, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1981).
59. Id at 2159, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 649.
60. Id.
61. Id at 2162-63, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 653.
62. Id at 2163, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 654.
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The four dissenters believed that a parent's interest in the care and cus-
tody of his or her child was of such unique importance that a court should
not attempt to judicially extinguish the right without providing the parents
the benefit of counsel.63 Lassiter, however, does not close the door on a
requirement of representation by counsel in some, and perhaps most, ter-
mination cases. The Court was closely divided, and Justice Stewart, who
authored the majority opinion has resigned. This case should be a signal
to Texas to become "enlightened and wise" by providing for representa-
tion by counsel in all state initiated parental termination cases.
Two other cases of interest to family lawers practicing in the parent-
child area were decided during the survey period. In HL v. Matheson the
Court, in further considering the abortion rights of minors, held that when
an unemancipated minor girl, who was living at home and dependent
upon her parents, sought an abortion, the state could require that notice be
given to her parents before the abortion was performed. 64 The Court
pointed out, however, that the parents are not given veto power, but
merely the opportunity to be consulted, and to give guidance and counsel
to the minor.65
A statutory rape law was attacked as gender-based discrimination in
Michael M v. Superior Court66 because only men could be found crimi-
nally liable under the statute. A rather fragmented Court67 held that when
a legitimate state interest exists, discrimination based on gender differences
is not unconstitutional. 68 The Court found that the statute "reasonably re-
flects the fact that the consequences of sexual intercourse and pregnancy
fall more heavily on the female than on the male."
'69
III. STATUS
The right of undocumented alien children to a free public education has
not yet been decided. The United States Supreme Court has heard oral
argument in the case, and a decision is expected by late spring.70 The chil-
dren currently are attending school in compliance with various court
orders.7 i
The eligibility rules of the University Interscholastic League (UIL) con-
63. Id at 2164, 2176, 68 L. Ed. 2d 655, 670.
64. 450 U.S. 398, 409 (1981).
65. Id at 409-10.
66. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
67. Only two members of the Court joined in the opinion written by Justice Rehnquist
on behalf of the Court. Two Justices wrote separate concurring opinions and four Justices
dissented.
68. 450 U.S. at 468-69.
69. Id at 476. For a Texas view of sex distinctions, particularly relating to that of a
father from a mother of a child born out of wedlock, see In re T.E.T., 603 S.W.2d 793 (Tex.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1025 (1981); In re K., 535 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 907 (1976).
70. The Court heard oral arguments on Dec. 1, 1981. Plyler v. Doe, 50 U.S.L.W. 3462
(1981). For an editorial summary of the arguments, see id at 3457.
71. See Boe v. Wright, 648 F.2d 432, 433 (5th Cir. 1981); Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448,
461 (5th Cir. 1980),prob.iuris noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044, 68 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1981); In re Alien
19821
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tinue to be questioned. The Texas Supreme Court overturned the UIL's
one victory of last year and held that the rule preventing a high school
student from representing a different school district for one calendar year
after moving into the new district was a denial of equal protection and
therefore unconstitutional. 72 In connection with two other rules, however,
Texas courts denied preliminary injunctions. The first case concerned the
nineteen-year age limit on high school participants; the injunction was de-
nied because the court found it unlikely that the proponents would win on
the merits. 73 The denial of the injunction in the other case, concerning the
number of years a participant could remain eligible for UIL competition,
was on technical grounds.74
Jones v. Latexo Independent School District75 involved the suspension of
several students because of a violation of school rules regarding the posses-
sion of drug paraphernalia. The court granted a preliminary injunction so
that one of the student plaintiffs could graduate from high school.76 Dur-
ing the challenged search, the entire student body had been subjected to an
inspection by a "sniffer" dog.77 The court found that this search violated
the students' fourth amendment rights.78 The school district argued that
the doctrine of in loco parentis should permit them greater latitude in car-
rying out measures necessary for the maintenance of discipline and or-
der.79 While agreeing that the school board's concern over drug abuse was
appropriate, the court held that even though school employees are at times
placed in the role of parents, the doctrine of in loco parentis cannot tran-
scend constitutional rights.80 The court therefore enjoined the school
board from further use of the "sniffer" dogs. 81
A child's name is important not only in relation to his status but also in
relation to his school records. Some divorced parents attempt to use self-
help to change their child's name by enrolling him in school with a sur-
name different from the one that was given the child at birth, and ordered
retained by the court at the time of the divorce. In In re Baird82 the court
Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 597 (S.D. Tex. 1980), prob. ]uris noted, 101 S.
Ct. 3078, 69 L. Ed. 2d 950 (1981).
72. Sullivan v. University Interscholastic League, 599 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1980), rev'd, 616 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Tex. 1981).
73. Blue v. University Interscholastic League, 503 F. Supp. 1030, 1036 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
74. University Interscholastic League v. Torres, 616 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1981, no writ).
75. 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
76. Id at 240.
77. A "sniffer" dog is a dog trained to detect a wide variety of illicit odors. The students
remained seated in their classrooms, and the dog walked up and down the aisles sniffing
each student. If the dog detected a target odor, he signaled his handler. Id at 228.
78. Id. at 237. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides: "The right of the people to be secure
. . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ... "
79. The doctrine of in loco parentis provides that school teachers and administrators
have the authority to discipline during school hours, because they are responsible for the
health, safety, and conduct of the stuents. 499 F. Supp. at 236.
80. Id
81. Id at 241.
82. 610 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ).
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was confronted with a selfhelp situation. Relying on Newman v. King,8 3
the appeals court affirmed the decree ordering the natural mother and her
husband not to permit the child to use any other name than Baird while
the child attended school.84 The court pointed out that it was protecting
the father's interest in having, his child bear his surname. 85
For inheritance purposes the proper establishment of paternity is most
important. In Lalli v. LaMi86 and Trimble v. Gordon87 the United States
Supreme Court attempted to establish what a state can do to provide for
the orderly disposition of estates when a claim is asserted by a possible
illegitimate child. The Texas Legislature responded to these decisions by
modifying the Probate Code,8 8 but the modification has not resolved ques-
tions concerning the effect of the Supreme Court's decisions on the inheri-
tance rights of possible heirs born prior to the change. The cases in Texas
are in total confusion as to the retroactive effect of the LaNi and Trimble
decisions. In Lovejoy v. Little,89 decided in 1978, one Texas apellate court
declared the unamended section 42 unconstitutional to the extent it vio-
lated the holding in Trimble.90 Another court, in Winn v. Lackey,91 re-
fused to apply the decisions retroactively.92 The decedent died intestate in
1973, before Trimble, but the suit was brought in 1978 after both Trimble
and Lovejoy had been decided. Instead of merely refusing to follow
Lovejoy, the court attempted to distinguish Winn from Lovejoy on the
ground that the suit in Lovejoy had been filed prior to Trimble while the
suit in Winn was filed after Trimble.93 Since the hearings in both cases
were held after Trimble, the filing distinction seems meaningless. 94 Never-
theless the Winn court sustained the unconstitutional version of section 42
of the Probate Code in cases where the decedent died prior to Trimble.95
Bell v. Hinkle96 is an even more poorly reasoned decision. The court never
mentioned Trimble, and although the decedent died intestate in 1969, the
83. 433 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1968).
84. 610 S.W.2d at 253.
85. Id at 254.
86. 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (statute upheld requiring judicial declaration of paternity before
father's death); see Solender, supra note 55, at 144-45.
87. 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (statute allowing illegitimate children to inherit by intestate
succession only from their mothers held unconstitutional); see Solender, Family Law- Parent
and Child, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 155, 156 (1979).
88. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42 (Vernon 1980) was enacted in 1979. The 1979 version
improves a 1977 amendment to § 42, which in turn had been enacted in response to Trimble.
89. 569 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
90. The Tyler court held that the three illegitimate children were entitled to inherit from
their father to the same extent that they could from their mother. Id at 504.
91. 618 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, no writ).
92. Id
93. Id
94. The decedent in Lovejoy died in 1971, the suit for determination of heirship was
filed in 1974, and the hearing was held in 1977, right after the decision in Trimble. 569
S.W.2d at 502-03.
95. 618 S.W.2d at 912.
96. 607 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 180, no writ), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 115, 70 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1981).
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court applied the 1979 version of the Probate Code. 97 The 1979 version of
the Probate Code provides that an illegitimate child may inherit from his
father if the father has complied with the provisions of chapter 13 of the
Family Code.98 In 1969 the Family Code had not yet been enacted, 99 so
unless the putative father had had unusual foresight he could not have
complied with its provisions.
Still another inheritance case, Jones v. Davis, °° concerned the issue
whether an illegitimate daughter and an illegitimate grandson could in-
herit from their father and grandfather, respectively. Both men died intes-
tate, neither having taken any steps to legitimate their children. On
motion for summary judgment, the trial court held that the children could
not inherit; the appellate court reversed and remanded.' 0 ' The decedent in
the case had died intestate in 1978, after Trimble, but before the 1979
change in the Probate Code. The appeals court, in reversing, merely stated
that the old probate statute must be held unconstitutional, and followed
Trimble and Lovejoy.10 2
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and reinstated the
trial court's decision.103 The court discussed the history and reasoning of
the United States Supreme Court in illegitimacy cases and concluded that
the 1979 version of Probate Code section 42, in effect at decedent's death in
1978, was constitutional. 0 4 The court also pointed out that the United
States Supreme Court had dealt only with first generation illegitimates.
Johnson v. Mariscal, s05 unlike the cases previously discussed, concerned
the inheritance rights of an illegitimate child whose alleged father died
testate. The will, which was executed in 1971, made no provision for the
illegitimate child, who was born in 1977. The mother of the child con-
tested the will on his behalf, asking that the will be set aside on the basis
that the child was a pretermitted heir. The court engaged in some rather
complex reasoning and decided that the Probate Code definition of
child, 106 while excluding unrecognized illegitimate children, specifically
did not exclude recognized illegitimate children. 10 7 Thus the court found
irrelevant any discussion of legitimation in other portions of the Code, be-
97. 607 S.W.2d at 937.
98. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b) (Vernon 1980).
99. Chapter 13 was enacted in 1975. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13 (Vernon 1975 &
Supp. 1982).
100. 616 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981), rev'd, 25 Tex. Sup. Ct.
J. 122 (Jan. 9, 1982).
101. 616 S.W.2d at 278.
102. Id
103. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 122 (Jan. 9, 1982).
104. Id at 126. The court stated that the pre-1977 version of § 42 probably would have
been held unconstitutional under Trimble, but did not decide if the Supreme Court intended
Trimble to have retroactive effect. Id at 123 n.l.
105. 620 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981), writ re'd n.r.e per curiam,
25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 128 (Jan. 9, 1982).
106. "'Child' includes an adopted child ... but, unless expressly so stated herein, does
not include an unrecognized, illegitimate child of the father." TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(b)
(Vernon 1980) (emphasis added).
107. 620 S.W.2d at 908.
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cause the definition of a pretermitted child in connection with a will in-
cluded recognized illegitimate children.108 The jury had found that the
child in question was the natural child of the decedent but had made no
finding with respect to the issue of recognition. The court therefore re-
versed and remanded the case for a finding on the recognition question. 109
If Johnson endures, the inheritance rights of some illegitimates in Texas
will be different from the rights of other illegitimates, and all illegitimates
will continue to be treated differently from legitimates." 0
Establishing paternity when the father wishes to contest the allegation is
difficult at best, and the Texas courts and legislature seem to delight in
creating additional procedural difficulties."' Thus, in Decuire v. Sine-
gal 12 although the father had signed a statement of paternity, he argued
that the statement had not been executed in strict compliance with the stat-
ute. The appeals court, apparently bought the argument, and reversed the
trial court's order legitimating the child and remanded. 1' 3 Focusing on the
absence of a trial court finding that the statement had been properly exe-
cuted, and the lack of any blood test evidence, the appellate court held that
the facts were insufficient to establish paternity.' '4 The court noted, how-
ever, that the father had never denied paternity." 5
Jurisdictional grounds were the basis for the denial of access to the
Texas courts for an out-of-state mother and child inAlbers v. Ames. 1 6 The
alleged father was a Texas resident, but the court stated that no jurisdic-
tion existed over the mother and child. " 7 The denial of jurisdiction is most
disheartening because the court not only applied the UCCJA jurisdiction
provisions to a paternity action, but also noted that the Colorado court had
denied relief because it had no jurisdiction over the Texas resident defend-
ant father." 8 Seemingly, if the father is a Texas resident, no court other
108. Id
109. Id at 909.
110. The distinction between children whose fathers have complied with statutory for-
malities, such as marrying their mothers or legitimating, and those whose fathers have not
complied will continue, but there now will be a distinction among those illegitimate children
whose fathers have not complied with any of the statutory formalities. Children whose fa-
thers have not executed wills will be distinguished from those whose fathers have executed
wills, but did not mention them. So a twice-overlooked child is in a better position.
11. The Texas Legislature created the difficulties when it originally enacted a one-year
statute of limitations. The Texas courts aggravated the problem by sustaining the one-year
statute of limitations. See Texas Dep't of Human Resources v. Chapman, 570 S.W.2d 46
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ refd n.r.e.). But see In re Miller, 605 S.W.2d 332 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980), writ granted sub nom. In re J.A.M., 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 202
(Jan. 31, 1981); note 10 supra and accompanying text.
112. 617 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1981, no writ).
113. Id at 727.
114. Id The Texas Department of Human Resources seemingly fares better in paternity
actions. In two recent cases its allegations were sustained. See Martinez v. Texas Dep't of
Human Resouces, 620 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ);
Williams v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 619 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1981, no writ).
115. 617 S.W.2d at 727.
116. 616 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
117. Id at 654.
118. Id at 654-55.
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than a Texas court would have jurisdiction to determine his rights. In
Albers the mother, by bringing the action in a Texas court, availed herself
of its jurisdiction and the Texas court arguably should have acted.' " 9
The problem of proving paternity is not necessarily confined to illegiti-
mate children. When successive marriages have occurred, the question of
which marriage or which husband produced a particular child can become
quite involved. G- v. G- 120 was such a case in which the trial court found
that the child was a product of the first marriage. The appeals court, how-
ever, held that this finding was against the weight of the evidence and
therefore reversed and remanded. 21 Noting the trial court's finding that
the mother did not prove her case by a preponderance of the evidence, the
dissent argued that the appellate court should not have substituted its view
of the credibility of the evidence for that of the trial court. 122
IV. CONSERVATORSHIP
When, at the time of divorce, the parties are unable to agree as to who
shall be named managing conservator, the courts face a most difficult deci-
sion. At the outset, the parents are on an equal plane, 23 and the amount
of evidence necessary to tip the scales one way or the other is merely a
preponderance of the evidence as in any other civil suit. 124 The court's
primary consideration is the best interests of the children, 25 and in mak-
ing this determination the court considers the circumstances of the par-
ents.' 26 If the children are twelve years of age or older the court must
confer with the children,' 27 and in the absence of contradictory evidence is
likely to accord great weight to their preferences. Fettig v. Fefig'28 is an
instance in which the trial court awarded managing conservatorship of all
the children to the father after the three older children had indicated they
wished to live with him. The fourth child was included in the order be-
cause the court found that it was in the best interest of the children that
they remain as a familial unit. When the children are younger than
twelve, unrefuted evidence that one party is competent and willing to be
appointed managing conservator can be sufficint. 29 If a nonparent con-
tests the appointment of a parent as managing conservator, when no per-
manent managing conservator has been appointed, however, the burden is
119. For problems in connection with interpretation of UCCJA, see note 6 supra and
accompanying text.
120. 604 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
121. Id. at 522.
122. Id. at 524.
123. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.01(b) (Vernon 1975) provides that "in determining
which parent to appoint as managing conservator, the court shall consider the qualifications
of the respective parents without regard to the sex of the parent."
124. Id § 11.14(a).
125. Id § 14.07(a).
126. Id § 14.07(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
127. Id § 14.07(c).
128. 619 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ).
129. Lott v. Lott, 605 S.W.2d 665, 669 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ dism'd).
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on the contestant to show that it would not be in the best interests of the
child to permit the parent to become the managing conservator. This is a
much heavier burden than in the normal contested conservatorship situa-
tion and is in conformity with the legislature's intent that parents be given
preference in custody matters.' 30
The importance of checking final judgments for clerical errors cannot be
overstated. In Bockemehl v. Bockemeh/' 31 a divorce was granted on the
basis of an agreement between the parties; the formal decree was signed
later, however, and it reversed the parties as to managing conservatorship.
The mother discovered the error several years later when the father re-
fused to return the child after a visitation period. When the court denied
her application for a writ of habeas corpus because the decree did not indi-
cate that she had the right of possession, the mother brought an action to
correct the original decree nunc pro tunc. The request for correction of the
decree was granted, and the appellate court affirmed, stating that sufficient
evidence existed to show that the confusion was caused entirely by a cleri-
cal error. Seeking correction of an original decree is important for two
reasons. First, it will enable the true managing conservator to obtain a
writ of habeas corpus if necessary. Additionally, as the appellate court in
Bockemehl pointed out, in the event of a custody modification suit, the
party seeking the change will have the burden of proving change of cir-
cumstances; thus the correct managing conservator would have a lighter
burden. 132 Following through on causes of action is important not only in
connection with checking the accuracy of a decree, but also in pursuing the
decree in the first place. Dismissing a divorce action for want of prosecu-
tion relieves the court of continuing jurisdiction, and eliminates any possi-
bility of enforcement of temporary orders entered in connection with the
dismissed cause of action.' 33
The facts concerning the children's residence can be determinative in
establishing jurisdiction to decide custody. In Felch v. Felch 134 the trial
court found that the children were domiciled in Texas with their mother at
time of trial. Although the children were actually in the State of Washing-
ton with their father, the court defined their stay as a temporary visit that
had no effect on the jurisdiction of the Texas court. The court seemed to
base its decision on the fact that the mother had filed her suit for divorce in
Texas a week prior to the father's filing in Washington, thus giving her the
prize for winning the race to the courthouse. This case actually raises
more questions than it answers since domicile is not considered a basis for
jurisdiction under the Family Code. 135 Specific dates of residence of the
130. See Hamlet v. Silliman, 605 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980,
no writ) (court stated natural mother's sister would have to show that it would not be in best
interests of child to permit mother to become managing conservator).
131. 604 S.W.2d 466 (Tex Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
132. See id at 470.
133. See Rosser v. Rosser, 620 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981,
no writ).
134. 605 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ dism'd).
135. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.045 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
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children, therefore, should have been alleged instead of the determination
being made on what the court itself characterized as "somewhat vague"
evidence.' 36 The summary disposition of Felch might make it possible for
Washington to deny full faith and credit to the decree, with the result be-
ing the lack of a final settlement of custody.
An out-of-state divorce decree determining custody of a child was held
not entitled to full faith and credit when a Texas court had assumed juris-
diction in the matter prior to the entry of the decree. ' 37 The court further
found that the Texas managing conservator had not been named a party to
the out-of-state suit, and thus the decree could not bind her.138 The Texas
court while purporting to settle the question of custody, has in reality laid
the groundwork for further litigation and controversy. The managing con-
servator was not even a parent, she was a paternal aunt, and it is unlikely
that Kansas, the other state, will recognize the Texas decree. If the child is
ever found outside of Texas, Kansas could assert that its decree is the en-
forceable one and would probably succeed.
The Texas Legislature created an additional source of litigation and tur-
moil in the child custody area by providing access rights to grandpar-
ents. 139 Minns v. MinnsM4 ° is interesting because the court granted each set
of grandparents and each parent specific access rights. The decree named
the mother managing conservator and named all the others possessory
conservators with various access rights. The appellate court affirmed all of
the visitation provisions. 14'
Even if a grandparent is not named in the original divorce decree, he
can petition to be named possessory or managing conservator at a later
date. Oglesby v. Sicott 142 was a suit for modification of the original decree
in which the Court granted a grandfather possessory conservator status.
His actual possession of his grandchild was conditioned upon his posting a
$10,000 bond. The appeals court affirmed this condition, finding it neces-
sary in light of the fact that the grandfather already had participated in the
kidnapping of the child by the child's mother.143 In another modification
action the trial court named the paternal grandparents managing conserva-
tors. The appellate court reversed this decision, however, pointing out that
136. 605 S.W.2d at 400.
137. Gunter v. Glasgow, 608 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, no writ).
138. d at 276.
139. TEx. FAM. CODE Am. § 14.03(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982) provides:
If the court finds that it is in the best interests of the child as provided in
Section 14.07 of this code, the court may grant reasonable access rights to
either the maternal or paternal grandparents of the child; and to either the
natural maternal or paternal grandparents of a child whose parent-child rela-
tionship has terminated or who has been adopted before or after the effective
date of this code. Such relief shall not be granted unless one of the child's
legal parents at the time the relief is requested is the child's natural parent.
The court may issue any necessary orders to enforce said decree.
140. 615 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ dism'd).
141. Id at 898.
142. 620 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ).
143. Id at 825.
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the appellees had not sustained their burden of proof as to a substantial
change in circumstances.'" The courts have limited the opportunity for
grandparents to seek access rights to situations where litigation already has
occurred concerning the parent-child relationship. Therefore, when the
change in circumstances has occurred because of the death of a parent, the
grandparents cannot obtain a possessory conservatorship because no man-
aging conservator has ever been appointed.' 45
Once the question of conservatorship has been settled, the Family Code
requires that a year elapse before a motion to modify may be filed unless
emergency situations exist or consensual modifications are involved. 46
The statute requires that the movant attach an affidavit to the early modifi-
cation that details the circumstances.147 Whether these provisions are ju-
risdictional or waivable is unclear. In Jilek v. Chatman148 the court
successfully straddled the issue by finding that, while the modification mo-
tion had been filed twelve days early without an affidavit attached, the trial
court took no immediate action on it, and the appellant father did not
complain of the lack of an affidavit until four months later. Alternatively,
the court held that the appellant father had timely filed his motion, and
because the two motions to modify were consolidated by agreement of the
parties and heard together, the court had power to decide all matters relat-
ing to the custody of the child. 149 The untimely motion was, therefore,
made timely by piggybacking on the timely motion. The apparent failure
of a joint custody decree to meet the needs of the child was the substantive
basis of the modification request. The custody decree provided that the
144. Neal v. Neal, 606 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
145. See In re KLM, 609 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, no writ) (no in-
dependent cause of action for right of access by grandparents when no managing conserva-
tor appointed).
146. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982). The Family Code allows
consehsual modifications. See id § 14.06(a), which provides:
To promote the amicable settlement of disputes between the parties to a suit
under this chapter, the parties may enter into a written agreement containing
provisions for conservatorship and support of the child, modifications of
agreement or orders providing for conservatorship and support of the child,
and appointment of joint managing conservators.
147. Id § 14.08(d) provides:
If the motion is filed for the purpose of changing the designation of the
managing conservator and is filed within one year after the date of issuance of
the order or decree to be modified, there shall be attached to the motion an
affidavit executed by the person making the motion. The affidavit must con-
tain at least one of the following allegations along with the supportive facts:(1) that the child's present environment may endanger his physi-
cal health or significantly impair his emotional development; or
(2) that the managing conservator is the person seeking the mod-
ification or consents to the modification, and the modification is in the
best interest of the child.
148. 613 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1981, no writ).
149. Id at 560. In Kirbyv. Langley, 612 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no
writ), the appellate court relied on TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.06 (Vernon Supp. 1982) in
sustaining the premature filing of a motion to modify. Both parents had joined in that mo-
tion; the court reasoned the motion was a type of agreement concerning conservatorship,
and therefore did not have to comply with the strict requirements of § 14.08(d).
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mother be managing conservator during January, November, and Decem-
ber, and that the father be managing conservator for the remaining months
of the year. The court found that the custody arrangement would interfere
with school attendance, and that sufficient evidence existed to support the
change in conservatorship that named the mother managing conservator
and the father possessory conservator with the right of possession of the
child on weekends and during summer vacation. 150
Joint managing conservatorship decrees may be becoming more com-
mon. In Terrett v. Wagenor the court modified such a joint decree.' 5 ' Al-
though the mother had requested the change, the trial court ruled in favor
of the father, naming him managing conservator. In addition to naming
the father managing conservator, the trial court ordered the mother to pay
$150 per month in child support. The father had responded to the plead-
ings prepared by the mother with a general denial. Although the father
had filed no pleadings for affirmative relief, the appellate court, relying on
the Family Code test of the best interest of the child,'52 sustained the trial
court's modification. 153 The appellate court pointed out that the Texas
Supreme Court in Leithold v. Plass 154 had held that once the jurisdiction of
a court was invoked in a child custody matter, "it becomes the duty of the
court in the exercise of its equitable powers to make proper disposition of
all matters comprehended thereby in a manner supported by the
evidence." 55
The basis for modifying managing conservatorship also is being ques-
tioned. When the only question put to a jury is whether the present man-
aging conservator should be retained, the standard is that such retention
must be injurious to the child before a change may be granted. ' 5 6 If, how-
ever, the court additionally asks whether a different managing conservator
would be a positive improvement, the jury's answer might differ, because it
is not necessary that present conditions be injurious for a change to be an
improvement. If both questions are asked of the jury and weighed against
one another, a change in circumstances on the part of the current manag-
ing conservator no longer would be a necessary condition for change; all
that would need to be shown is that a change in the circumstances of the
person applying for the change has occurred such that it would be a posi-
tive improvement for the child. The problem of what standard is to be
used in changing managing conservator is not answered clearly by the stat-
ute. Although the standards are written in the conjunctive, the persons
whose conditions must be found to have changed are the child or thepar-
ent, not the managing conservator. In most cases the person seeking a
change is a parent as well as a possessory conservator. In Jones v. Jones
150. 613 S.W.2d at 560.
151. 613 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
152. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.07(a) (Vernon 1975).
153. 613 S.W.2d at 311.
154. 413 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. 1967).
155. Id at 701.
156. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
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the court held that the circumstances of both the managing and possessory
conservator parents should be weighed by the jury in determining who
should prevail.' 57 Other courts have held to the contrary. 158 The Texas
Supreme Court has solved the conflict by reversing Jones and holding that
the term "parent" in the statute does not include the possessory conserva-
tor. 159 The court stated that "it is irrelevant whether or not there has been
a change in the circumstances of the possessory conservator,"' 60 and that
only if there was a finding of a change in the circumstances of the child or
managing conservator could the factfinder look at the circumstances of the
possessory conservator. 16 The Supreme Court decision in Jones did not
affect a number of custody modification decisions made during the survey
period since they were based on the conclusion that the continuation of the
same managing conservator would be injurious to the child.' 62
When a potential managing conservator is not a parent or a relative, the
courts are likely to treat him as an interloper, even though he may have
had custody of the children. In Pratt v. Texas Department of Human Re-
sources the court went so far as to deny standing to a potential adoptive
father who had had custody of the children for more than a year. 163 The
parental rights of the biological parents had been terminated in Moore
County, and the Texas Department of Human Resources (TDHR) ap-
pointed managing conservator. The TDHR placed the children with the
appellant and his wife in Potter County, and considered the couple as po-
tential adoptive parents. Before the finalization of the adoption, the
couple separated and indicated an intent to divorce. The TDHR therefore
removed the children from the couple's home, and placed them in foster
homes outside of Potter County. The appellant filed a motion in Moore
County to modify conservatorship and to transfer the hearing to Potter
County, asserting that the transfer was mandatory because the children's
157. 614 S.W.2d 190, 193 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981), rey'd, 25 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 120 (Jan. 9, 1982).
158. See Ogrydziak v. Ogrydziak, 614 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, no
writ); Wright v. Wright, 610 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ).
159. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 119, 120 (Jan. 9, 1982).
160. Id. at 121.
161. Id at 120-21. The court specifically disapproved the language in Watts v. Watts,
563 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.), which had stated that
the term "Parent," as used in TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1982),
included both custodial and noncustodial parents. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 121.
162. See, e.g., Lopez v. Soliz, 619 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no
writ) (deposition of child's physician sufficient evidence to show that retention of managing
conservator would be injurious to welfare of child); Jeffers v. Wallace, 615 S.W.2d 252 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ) (remarriage of managing conservator and turbulent rela-
tionship with older brother was such material and injurious change of circumstances as to
warrant change of custody); In re F.J.K., 608 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1980,
no writ) (arrest of managing conservator's new husband for felony possession of marijuana
and evidence of physical neglect of children found sufficient for change of managing conser-
vators); Roe v. Doe, 607 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, no writ) (evidence that
managing conservator had been living with a man and that they used marijuana in child's
presence, as well as possessory conservator's care of child during her sickness, held sufficient
to find material change in circumstances).
163. 614 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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residence was in Potter County since they had been in appellant's home for
more than a year. 164 The trial court denied the motion to transfer, and
dismissed the modification motion on the basis that the former foster par-
ent had no standing to bring a modification suit. The appellate court af-
firmed the rulings of the trial court, rigidly reading the venue provisions of
the statute relevant to the motion to transfer.' 65 For venue to be placed
with a nonparent and nonmanaging conservator, the court held that the
child must be under that person's care and control at the time of hearing
on the motion to transfer.166 The children had been removed from appel-
lant's care a little over a month prior to the filing of the motion to transfer.
The court therefore stated that the standing requirements had not been
met. 167 The court took judicial notice of the fact that the counties were
adjacent, and that the courthouses were 45 miles apart, which distance was
not so inconvenient for appellant as to amount to an abuse of discretion. 1
68
The purpose of the venue provisions of the statute is to make it possible
for hearings to be held where the evidence concerning the child's welfare is
most readily available. The rigid reading of the statute in Pratt subverts
that purpose. The real issue, however, is the matter of standing. In consid-
ering who may bring a modification suit, the court limited the phrase "any
person with an interest in the child"' 69 to mean those persons entitled to
service of citation in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship.170 The
list of such persons is limited to those with a legal interest in the child, and
does not include unrelated persons who may have had physical custody of
the child. Relying on this limited list, the court held that the appellant
could not bring a motion to modify conservatorship. 171 The court, how-
ever, apparently misreads the intent of the legislature in framing the Fam-
ily Code. The phrase "any person with an interest in the child" was
intended for the protection of the child as well as the court. A court should
hear all parties who might have an interest in the child; then, armed with
full knowledge of the circumstances, the court could make an informed
decision as to the best interest of the child. To limit unnecessarily the per-
sons the court can hear works to the detriment of both the child and the
court. Denying standing to truly interested persons substitutes a proce-
dural device for a hearing on the merits; when the welfare of children is
concerned, such is not the law.172
Drexel v. McCutcheon173 addressed an issue important to lawyers. A
164. Id at 492. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.06(b) (Vernon 1975) sets venue in the
county where a child has lived for more than six months.
165. 614 S.W.2d at 496; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.04(c)(4) (Vernon 1975).
166. 614 S.W.2d at 493.
167. Id at 495-96.
168. Id at 494.
169. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.03 (Vernon 1975).
170. 614 S.W.2d at 495; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.09(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
171. 614 S.W.2d at 494-95.
172. Holley v. Adam, 544 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tex. 1976) (procedural irregularities and
pleading defects will be overlooked when best interests of child clearly at stake).
173. 604 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
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lawyer is entitled to legal fees for successfully defending the custodial par-
ent's right to continue as managing conservator if this service was neces-
sary and for the benefit of the child. Obviously, if the court finds that the
status quo is in the best interest of the child, then defending it is necessary
for the child. The question in Drexel, however, was whether unsuccessfully
defending the custodial parent's right could be a necessary service to the
child. The court held that legal fees could be necessary even when the
custodial parent failed to prevail, if the record established that the legal
services were performed for the benefit of the child.174 The jury's answer
on the question of legal fees, however, was nonresponsive; hence, the court
reversed and remanded on that issue.
Modification of custody decrees can present problems when both par-
ents are present within the state. The problems are compounded, however,
when one of the parents has left the state or has never been in Texas. In
Campbell v. Campbell175 the managing conservator mother and the child
had been in Louisiana for at least twenty-seven months before the Texas
father filed a motion to modify. The Texas court, applying the recently
revised statute on exceptions to jurisdiction, 176 held that since the manag-
ing conservator and the child had maintained their residence in Louisiana
for over six months, the trial court was correct in dismissing the motion,
because it no longer had jurisdiction over the managing conservator and
the child. 177
Kelly v. Novak17 8 was another case involving out of state considerations.
The couple divorced in Texas, and the court named the mother managing
conservator and the father possessory conservator, giving him liberal visi-
tation privileges. About six months after the divorce decree, the mother
remarried and left Texas to reside in the State of Washington. Less than
six months later, the father filed a motion to modify the custody decree.
The mother was properly served, but, on the advice of her attorney, did
not appear at the hearing. The trial court made extensive changes in the
visitation provisions, but retained the mother as managing conservator.
The mother then filed a motion to set aside the judgment, contending that
the court had no jurisdiction to modify the original order because she, the
managing conservator, and the child were residents of Washington. The
trial court denied the motion. On appeal the court decided jurisdiction
existed because all the provisions for modification of an order had been
174. Id at 435. But see Reames v. Reames, 604 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1980, no.writ). The court found that it was an abuse of discretion to award attorney's fees to
the losing party in connection with a change in visitation. The court indicated that generally
a child's best interest can be served best by appointing a guardian ad litem for that purpose.
See also Klement v. Munder, 619 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ) (per
curiam) (abuse of discretion to tax parties other than parents attorney ad litem fees when
parents not indigent).
175. 617 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
176. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.052(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
177. 617 S.W.2d at 797.
178. 606 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1980, no writ).
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satisfied. 179 The mother had been absent from the state for less than six
months, and no exception to continuing jurisdiction therefore applied. 180
Having established the question of jurisdiction, the appellate court found
that a material change in circumstances had occurred, thereby necessitat-
ing a change in the visitation schedule. The child was no longer in Texas,
but resided in Washington, and such a great distance would require modi-
fication of the order that had contemplated a visitation schedule of every
other weekend. The appellate court also found the new schedule author-
ized by the trial court to be unworkable. Under the new schedule, the
child was required to be flown to Texas for nine days of each month. The
appellate court held that no evidence indicated that the new schedule was
in the best interest of the child, and therefore reversed and remanded. 18'
Although the court misread the exception to jurisdiction, it reached the
right result. The exception applies only if the managing conservator's sta-
tus is in question and makes no reference to the possessory conservator; 82
therefore, the court would have had jurisdiction in any event.
Perry v. Ponder,183 a very carefully and thoughtfully written opinion,
attempted to solve the problem of jurisdiction to modify custody when one
parent and the child are residents of Texas and the other parent has never
had any meaningful contact with Texas. The opinion was written before
the enactment of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 84 So
the statute's effect on the reasoning of the opinion is problematic. In Perry
the couple originally lived in Alabama and were divorced there. The
mother, who had been awarded custody, moved to Texas with the child.
The father then obtained a decree from the Alabama court modifying the
divorce decree so as to give him custody. The mother filed suit in Texas
for modification of conservatorship and child support payments. She al-
leged that the Alabama modification decree was void because she and the
child were Texas residents, and because she had received no notice and
had had no opportunity to appear at the Alabama hearing. The father was
duly served, ' 8 5 and he responded by means of a special appearance 8 6 ask-
ing that the suit be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over him.
The trial court dismissed the suit because it found that the father had in-
sufficient minimum contacts with Texas to constitutionally support an as-
sertion of personal jurisdiction. '8 7
The appellate court separated the issue of jurisdiction to render a sup-
port decree from the issue of jurisdiction over a custody decree, and found
179. Id at 28; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
180. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.052 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
181. 606 S.W.2d at 30; cf In re C.E.B., 604 S.W.2d 436, 439 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1980, no writ) (description of acceptable visitation schedule).
182. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.052(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
183. 604 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
184. For a discussion of the PKPA, see notes 1-7 supra and accompanying text.
185. TEX. R. Civ. P. 108.
186. Id 120a.
187. 604 S.W.2d at 312.
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that, on the basis of the holding in Kulko v. Superior Court,'8 8 deciding the
support issue would be a violation of due process. 189 The court, however,
determined that custody was more a matter of status than an obligation, so
factors other than minimum contacts might be considered in order to com-
ply with due process. 190 After looking to the principles of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act and distinguishing May v. Anderson,191 the court decided it might be
possible to assert personal jurisdiction over the father under section 4 of
the Texas parent-child long-arm statute.' 92 The court remanded the case
for a trial court determination of whether the mother and child had lived
in Texas long enough to give Texas a sovereign interest, and access to
enough evidence concerning the child's welfare so that a determination of
the child's best interest could be made. 193
Enforcement of child custody decrees has become an increasingly diffi-
cult problem. When the child is in the possession of a managing conserva-
tor who refuses to release the child to the possessory conservator for court
ordered visitation, one remedy is a contempt judgment.' 94 Sometimes
such a judgment is effective, and if violated, it can result in the imprison-
ment of the managing conservator. The original order should express
clearly the means by which the managing conservator can comply with the
order or purge himself should he happen to fail to comply, because if this
is not done the whole exercise may have be be repeated. 195
The more prevalent problem, however, has been the unlawful taking or
keeping of a child from the possession of its lawful custodian. The courts
have been active in this area, and the Congress of the United States has
also responded by passing legislation.' 96 On a number of occasions, the
Texas Supreme Court has issued writs of mandamus ordering trial courts
to grant writs of habeas corpus releasing children to the lawful possession
of their custodians. 197 The courts also have begun enforcing the Penal
Code provisions that make it an offense to retain a child outside of Texas
with knowledge that such action violates a valid court order.' 98 Addition-
188. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
189. 604 S.W.2d at 312.
190. Id at 321.
191. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
192. 604 S.W.2d at 312. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051(4) (Vernon Supp. 1982) states
that the court may exercise personal jurisdiction if "there is any basis consistent with the
constitutions of the state or the United States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction."
193. 604 S.W.2d at 322-23.
194. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.09(a) (Vernon 1975) (explicitly authorizing con-
tempt of court as penalty for refusal to conform with order of the court).
195. See, e.g., Exparte Brooks, 604 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ)
(court has no power to impose coercive imprisonment for contempt when order did not
specify reasonable extent of duty to surrender possession).
196. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1976); see notes 1-6 supra and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., Perry v. Scoggins, 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 19 (Oct. 24, 1981); Marshall v. Wil-
son, 616 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1981).
198. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982) provides:
A person commits an offense if he takes or retains a child younger than 18
years out of this state when he:
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ally, courts have been using the law of torts to obtain civil damages for the
wronged parties in child snatching cases.' 99 In Fenslage v. Dawkins a fed-
eral court held that Texas law would favor a tort remedy and awarded
$65,000 in damages and $65,000 in exemplary damages. 200
The controversy in Arringlon v. Arrington20 involved the possession of a
dog, and poignantly illustrates the sadness of the human condition in con-
nection with conservatorship. The husband appealed from a decree that
had made the wife managing conservator- of the dog, Bonnie Lou. The
court pointed out that, while "Bonnie Lou is a very fortunate little dog
with two humans to shower upon her attentions and genuine love fre-
quently not received by human children from their divorced parents ...
A dog. . . is not a human being and not treated in the law as such. A dog
is personal property. '20 2 "The office of 'managing conservator,' " accord-
ing to the court, "was created for the benefit of human children, not ca-
nine. ' 203 The court found that Bonnie Lou had been a gift to the wife and
therefore was her property. The husband agreed to his wife having cus-
tody as long as he could have the privilege of reasonable visitation. The
court upheld the guidelines established by the trial court, and summed up
by saying, "We are sure there is enough love in that little canine heart to
'go around'. Love is not a commodity that can be bought and sold-or
decreed. It should be shared and not argued about. ' '2°4
V. SUPPORT
Trial courts have wide discretion in establishing the amount required for
the support of a child.205 Appellate courts rarely question the decision,
(1) knows that his taking or retention violates the express terms of a judg-
ment or order of a court disposing of the child's custody; or
(2) has not been awarded custody of the child by a court of competent
jurisdiction and knows that a suit for divorce, or a civil suit or applica-
tion for habeas corpus to dispose of the child's custody, has been filed.
See Roberts v. State, 619 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (discussion of jurisdiction of
Texas courts in these matters).
199. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 (1977). See Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d
625, 629 (6th Cir. 1978); Schuppin v. Unification Church, 435 F. Supp. 603 (D. Vt.), af d,
573 F.2d 1295 (1st Cir. 1977).
200. 629 F.2d 1107, 1109 (5th Cir. 1980).
201. 613 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
202. Id at 569.
203. Id.
204. Id and amen.
205. See, e.g., Woods v. Woods, 619 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1981, no writ) (affirming decree awarding $200 per month for one child); Huls v. Huls, 616
S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [[st Dist.] 1981, no writ) (affirming decree awarding
$400 per month for one child); Zamora v. Zamora, 611 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1980, no writ) (affirming decree awarding $200 per month for two children); Saums
v. Saums, 610 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ dism'd) (affirming decree
awarding $200 per month for one child, despite court's knowledge that appellant was behind
in another child support obligation; see Saums v. Synoground, 605 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1980, no writ)); Lott v. Lott, 605 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980,
writ dism'd) (affirming decree awarding $240 per month for one child, although appellant
had only $800 per month income).
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and at least one has affirmed even the inclusion of a requirement for the
payment of medical expenses in a support decree. 206 The appellate court,
nevertheless reversed and remanded the trial court's decree in Price v.
Price,20 7 holding that use of a percentage of a father's net bonus as the
basis of child support was error.208 The court noted that past Texas cases
have disapproved of formulas in the calculation of child support.20 9 In
addition, the court pointed out that the father already had other child sup-
port obligations and speculated as to the result if the other children also
wanted "a piece of the action. ' '210 The appellate court sent the case back
for further findings since the original order for a basic $300 per month
child support included the bonus percentage.211
Some confusion exists concerning the evidence needed to support a
modification of a child support decree. It seems clear that when the cir-
cumstances of the obligor have changed materially and substantially for
the worse, a decrease in the support obligation is merited. 212 The child's
diminished needs are not the basis for the decrease in support for, in real-
ity, his needs probably have increased; rather the decrease is based on the
futility of attempting to maintain a support order that can not be enforced.
When the obligor's circumstances have improved, however, it has been ar-
gued that an obligee cannot demand an increase in support based on that
fact alone. Holt v. Holt213 correctly interpreted the Family Code by hold-
ing that "a material and substantial change in the circumstances of a party
affected by the order providing for support,"214 was sufficient to sustain an
order for an upward modification of the support order.2' 5
Other cases that have permitted the upward modification of support de-
crees have generally used reasoning similar to that in Holt, although usu-
ally not stating it as forcefully. In Strauss v. Strauss2 1 6 the court fortified
its decision to allow upward modification by mentioning that the child was
aging and soon would be attending school. The true basis for the modifi-
cation, however, was the discharge of the obligor's debts as a result of a
bankruptcy action, and a substantial increase in his income. The court
stated that the modification was justified "because of the needs of the child
206. Minns v. Minns, 615 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ
dism'd).
207. 606 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ).
208. Id at 53.
209. Id. at 52; see In re J.M. & G.M., 585 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1979, no writ); Doss v. Doss, 521 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no
writ); Barlow v. Barlow, 282 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1955, no writ).
210. 606 S.W.2d at 53.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., Watkins v. Austin, 590 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ);
MacAyeal v. MacAyeal, 575 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
213. 620 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
214. Id at 652. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982) states that
"the court may modify an order... if the circumstances of the child or a person affected by
the order. . . to be modified have materially and substantially changed since the entry of
the order." (Emphasis added.)
215. 620 S.W.2d at 651.
216. 619 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
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and the increased ability of the appellant toprovide his child with a life style
commensurate with his earnings. '217 McCartor v. Parr218 adds further sup-
port for the proposition that courts base their decisions primarily on the
obligor's ability to pay. In this case the appellate court held that to order
payments in excess of the obligor's ability to pay was an abuse of discre-
tion, despite evidence concerning the increased needs of the child. 219 The
father, a student, was supported by his father, and had no immediate job
prospects.
Sometimes modifications in support orders are more apparent than real
as when the number of children being supported decreases but the amount
per child increases.220 Other calculations may be hidden within support
orders, for example, the date on which the new order takes effect. The
effective date can be either the date of the filing of the motion for modifica-
tion or the date of the decree;221 the determination of the date is within the
trial court's discretion.222
For many litigants, the enforcement of support decrees is the most diffi-
cult part of the entire divorce procedure. One method of enforcement is a
contempt proceeding. 223 When all the correct procedures are followed, a
court may place an obligor in jail until he has complied with the provisions
of the contempt order.224 If, however, the obligor is able to show that the
contempt order (1) violated due process because of a lack of notice,225
(2) that he is unable to pay,226 (3) that the order lacks specificity or clar-
ity,227 or (4) that the order was phrased in the disjunctive and the obligor
217. Id at 20 (emphasis added).
218. 612 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ).
219. Id
220. See, e.g., Craig v. Jess, 620 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ) (af-
firming order increasing a 1978 order of $80 per month per child for five children to $135 per
month per child for three children; overall change only increase of $5 per month).
221. TEX. FAM. CODE Ai. § 14.08(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982) provides that "[a]n order
providing for the support of a child may be modified only as to obligations accruing subse-
quent to the motion to modify."
222. See, e.g., Black v. Bassett, 619 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, no
writ); Cox v. Cox, 609 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ).
223. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.09(a) (Vernon 1975); see Mnookin, Book Review, Using
Jailfor Child Support Enforcement, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 338 (1981) (reviewing D. CHAMBERS,
MAKING FATHERS PAY (1979)).
224. See Exparte Englutt, 619 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, no writ);
Exparte Wilson, 616 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ); Ex
parte Hodge, 611 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ); Exparte Hall, 611
S.W.2d 459 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ); Exparte Cummings, 610 S.W.2d 238
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ); Exparte Chacon, 607 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1980, no writ); Exparte Miller, 604 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1980, no writ).
225. See Exparte Bush, 619 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ); Exparte
Eureste, 614 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, no writ); Ex parte Crocker, 609
S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ); Exparte Gonzales, 606 S.W.2d 5 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ); Exparte McNemee, 605 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-
El Paso 1980, no writ).
226. See Exparte Sanders, 608 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980,
no writ); In re Anderson, 604 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ).
227. See Exparte White, 616 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ);
Exparte Quevedo, 611 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ); Exparte
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has complied with one of the orders,228 then habeas corpus will lie and the
obligor cannot be incarcerated. After a child has reached eighteen years of
age, child support orders no longer can be enforced by contempt. 229 In
addition, an obligation to support or pay money to a child, who at the time
of divorce is over eighteen, must be based on a contract 230 since no legal
duty to support exists.23' In such situations the regular venue statutes ap-
ply rather than the provisions of the Family Code. 232
Sometimes the best way to collect past due child support payments is to
reduce them to judgment. 233 Garnishment is also a possible method for
obtaining payment if Air Force retirement benefits are owing to the obli-
gor. Attorney's fees can be included in the amount garnished, if they were
incurred in the effort to obtain the past due support.234 Nagle v. Nagle235
represents a unique method for obtaining redress. In this case the husband
promised to deed to his wife his ownership interest in their house provided
she did not press the contempt proceeding then pending. She complied
with the agreement, but he did not. The court found that the wife proved
all the elements of fraud and awarded her the value of her husband's inter-
est in the house, plus the cost of prosecuting the suit.236
VI. TERMINATION AND ADOPTION
When the parent-child relationship is terminated and the child is legally
adopted by another, that child is legally the child of the new parent.237
The adopted child has no connection with his natural parent, except in
some instances, the right to inherit from that parent. 238 The court in Figue-
roa v. Santos 239 therefore ruled that for purposes of the Texas guest stat-
ute24° a child who has been adopted is no longer related to his natural
cousin and can bring an action for negligence if he is injured while riding
Mikeska, 608 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App,-Houston [lst Dist.] 1980, no writ); Exparte
Owens, 605 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
228. See Exparte Englutt, 608 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1980).
229. See Exparte Thomas, 609 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ).
230. Robertson v. Robertson, 608 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, no writ).
231. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05 (Vernon 1975) provides only that "[fthe court may
order either or both parents to make periodic payments or a lump-sum payment, or both, for
the support of the child until he is 18 years of age .... "
232. Busbey v. Busbey, 619 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Civ. App.-Huston [14th Dist.] 1981, no
writ) (when marriage settlement agreement provided remedy available as contract, venue
must be established under usual venue rules since action a general contract suit, not based
on Texas Family Code).
233. Rush v. Hagler, 611 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ) (hus-
band, failing to pay child support, could be held liable in general civil action, thereby ren-
dering wife judgment creditor).
234. Etzel v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 620 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
235. 617 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ granted).
236. Id at 813.
237. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.09 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1982).
238. Id § 15.07 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
239. 606 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
240. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6701b, § l(a) (Vernon 1975).
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as a guest in an automobile driven by that cousin. 24' Although the court in
Figueroa ruled on a question of first impression, 242 its holding is in con-
formity with holdings in other areas. Children legally adopted by another
have been denied the benefits of worker's compensation 243 and recovery
for wrongful death 244 following the death of a natural parent.
After a parent has been granted custody in a divorce action the parent
often remarries, and the new stepparent may wish to adopt the child of the
custodian. Adoption in Texas requires that the parent-child relationship
of the natural parent be terminated before a valid adoption proceeding can
take place. 245 While the termination and adoption proceedings can be
combined, 246 if the termination is reversed on appeal, the adoption also
will be invalid. 247 Such was the case in Mayfield v. Smith, in which the
appellate court found the mere fact that the father was imprisoned insuffi-
cient grounds for termination. 248 The court also found the evidence le-
gally insufficient to establish that the father had failed to support his minor
children in accordance with his ability. 249 Accordingly, the court reversed
the trial court judgment that had terminated the rights of the natural fa-
ther, and decreed the stepfather's adoption of the children invalid. 250
Jurisdiction to terminate the parent-child relationship can be problem-
atic in situations when one parent has never been in Texas and when a
state other than Texas decreed the original custody and support order.
Brewington v. Wertin251 might have been such a case, but the father volun-
tarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and the court found by
clear and convincing evidence 252 that he had failed to support the children
in accordance with his ability.253 As a result the court terminated his par-
ent-child relationship. 254 In re M.SB. 255 presented a different termination
situation. The father, by special appearance, 256 challenged the court's ju-
241. 606 S.W.2d at 352.
242. Id at 351.
243. Patton v. Shamburger, 431 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Tex. 1968).
244. Go Int'l, Inc. v. Lewis, 601 S.W.2d 495, 499 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ
refd n.r.e.).
245. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.03 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
246. Id § 16.03(b).
247. See Schiesser v. State, 544 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. 1976) (adoption decree entered
prior to final judgment terminating parent-child relationship ruled void).
248. 608 S.W.2d 767, 771 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ).
249. Id at 770. But see Belitz v. Seekatz, 570 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978,
writ refd n.r.e.) (evidence insufficient to support finding that father did not provide support
in accordance with his ability).
250. 608 S.W.2d at 771.
251. 609 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
252. In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1980) (use of clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard required in involuntary proceedings for termination of parent-child relationship); see
In re J.J., 617 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. 1981) (per curiam). The Texas Supreme Court in a per
curiam opinion refusing writ of error held that, while the decision in G.M. was prospective
in nature, cases pending at the time of the decision because of an appeal come within the
rule of that decision. Id. at 188.
253. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(1)(F) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
254. 609 S.W.2d at 306.
255. 611 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ).
256. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a.
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risdiction, and the trial court found that it had no jurisdiction and dis-
missed. Upon the mother's appeal, the appellate court in a wrongly
reasoned opinion decided that the trial court did have jurisdiction over the
nonresident father, and reversed and remanded. 257 The decision is wrong
in failing to differentiate between the process due in a termination pro-
ceeding and in a custody proceeding. The Family Code itself is mislead-
ing, since it would apply the same jurisdictional requirements to all suits
affecting the parent-child relationship, and makes no distinctions between
the various types of actions.258 The United States Supreme Court has held
that in support matters the person whose rights are being adjudicated must
have had minimum contacts with the forum state in order for a decision
concerning that person to be constitutional. 25 9 In MS.B. the father had
never been in Texas. Some years earlier a Texas court had increased the
father's child support payments after a hearing in which he did not appear.
This earlier order was not constitutionally valid, and if the grounds for
termination were based on the prior order, the termination should have
failed. In addition, the reasoning of Perry v. Ponder,260 on which the court
relied, 26' was based on the philosophy of the Uniform Child Custody Ju-
risdiction Act. Because the UCCJA is concerned only with matters of cus-
tody and not the permanent severing of parental rights, Perry was
irrelevant to this decision.
Sometimes adoptions take place in which the parties to the proceedings
are distantly related. 262 The evidence necessary for termination 263 is the
same as in actions between strangers264 or between the parents and the
state. 265 When no natural parents with a connection to the child remain,
257. 611 S.W.2d at 706.
258. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.045 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
259. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978).
260. 604 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ). For a discussion of Perry P.
Ponder, see notes 183-93 supra and accompanying text.
261. 611 S.W.2d at 706.
262. See, e.g., In re Guillory, 618 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1981,
no writ). The court found that the mother knowingly allowed the child to remain in condi-
tions or surroundings that endangered the child's physical and emotional well-being (see
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(l)(D) (Vernon Supp. 1982)) by sharing living quarters with
persons sniffing glue. 618 S.W.2d at 950. the court granted the termination and gave cus-
tody to an aunt of the child. Id at 951.
263. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
264. See, e.g., Diaz. v. Beyer, 611 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ refd
n.r.e.). In this case the father failed to provide adequate support or medical care at time of
birth (see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(1)(H) (Vernon Supp. 1982)) and the mother volun-
tarily left the child and expressed an intent not to return (see id § 15.02(l)(A)). Accord-
ingly, the court found sufficient grounds to terminate the parent-child relationship and
permit the appellee's adoption to be sustained, even though the natural parents had married
each other and wished to have their child back. 611 S.W.2d at 732.
265. See, e.g., In re R.L., 620 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ) (or-
der of termination reversed and remanded because evidence not clear and convincing); In re
L.F., 617 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ) (order of termination sus-
tained as factually sufficient in showing moderately retarded, emotionally disturbed mother
capable of knowingly allowing children to remain in conditions that endangered them); All-
red v. Harris County Child Welfare Unit, 615 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (order of termination sustained on finding that father's wilful
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the standard for who should adopt becomes one of the best interest of the
child. 266 After a decision has been made as to which party should be per-
mitted to adopt, the losing party, if not related to the child in any way, may
lose all rights to the child, including the visitation rights of a possessory
conservator. This was the decision of the court in Hopper v. Brittain 267 in
which the former wife and her new husband brought an adoption proceed-
ing in connection with a child of whom she and her former husband had
been given custody. After the divorce, the adoption not having been final-
ized, the wife was designated as managing conservator. While the former
husband had an opportunity to contest the adoption as possessory conser-
vator,268 the court found that once the adoption was finalized his posses-
sory conservatorship vanished. 269 Furthermore, the court held that a
parent-child proceeding need not be brought to terminate his rights, be-
cause he was not a "parent" within the contemplation of the Family
Code.270
Mendez v. Brewer 27l raised the question of a foster parent's right to in-
tervene in a suit to terminate the parent-child relationship. The foster par-
ents had the child in their custody as a result of a contract with the Texas
Department of Human Resources. They became attached to the child and
wished to adopt him. The trial court struck their intervention petition and
the appeals court reversed,272 but the Texas Supreme Court sustained the
action of the trial court.273 The supreme court reasoned that persons have
a right to intervene in a pending suit when they have an interest in the
subject matter of the litigation that is not merely contingent or remote.274
The court found that the only interest the foster parents had was in an
adoption and that that interest was contingent on the termination of paren-
tal rights. 275 Accordingly, the court stated that the Texas Department of
Human Resources, the parents, and the child were the real parties in inter-
est. 276 The court held that the foster parents were at most witnesses. 277
criminal activity with knowledge of wife's pregnancy and his subsequent imprisonment
amounted to voluntary abandonment); In re H.W.E., 613 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1981, no writ) (order of termination sustained based on clear and convincing evi-
dence of sexual abuse).
266. TE x. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.08 (Vernon Supp. 1982); see Remling v. Green, 610
S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ). This case marked the end
of a bitter controversy wherein the Texas Supreme Court had reversed and remanded the
original decision of the appellate court. See Remling v. Green, 601 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [ist Dist.]), rev'd and remanded, 608 S.W.2d 905 (1980).
267. 612 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
268. If he had not been designated possessory conservator he might be denied standing,
as was the foster parent in Pratt v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 614 S.W.2d 490 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See notes 163-72 supra and accompanying text.
269. 612 S.W.2d at 639.
270. Id; see TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.01(3) (Vernon 1975).
271. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 126 (Jan. 9, 1982).
272. Id at 127.
273. Id at 128.
274. Id at 127 (quoting Rogers v. Searle, 533 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus
Christi 1976, no writ)).
275. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 128.
276. Id
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Whenever parents attempt to contest the termination of their parental
rights by the Texas Department of Human Resources, they may experi-
ence difficulties in raising the necessary funds.278 When a proper appeal is
taken despite this difficulty, it is most unfortunate to have a court reporter
refuse to prepare the statement of facts unless she is paid. In Loflin v.
Weiss the court of civil appeals held that mandamus would issue despite
the fact that the reporter had resigned her official reporter position. 279 The
reporter contended that her property was being taken for public use with-
out compensation, but the court found that she already had been compen-
sated through the salary she received as an official court reporter.280
The Texas Supreme Court never has had the opportunity to rule on the
validity of the sections of the Family Code that permit a parent to relin-
quish all rights to his child and to waive his right to any notice or service of
process prior to the actual filing of a termination suit.28 1 Brown v. McLen-
nan County Children's Protective Services282 may offer the court such an
opportunity. In this case the mother executed an irrevocable affidavit re-
linquishing all parental rights to her two children and waiving future serv-
ice of process. In a subsequent proceeding the trial court terminated her
parental rights. The mother then filed for a writ of error and for a state-
ment of facts. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, find-
ing that she ceased to be an interested party after she had executed the
affidavit. 283 Because numerous adoptions have been granted based on ter-
minations involving irrevocable affidavits of relinquishment and waivers
of process prior to the actual filing of the petition to terminate the parent-
child relationship,284 it is hoped that the Texas Supreme Court will seize
this opportunity to determine the correct procedures. Termination of the
parent-child relationship is not something that should be done lightly; the
procedures should be followed carefully and meticulously in spirit as well
as form. The legislature established the current method some years ago,
and if the agencies have been following it correctly their actions should be
sustained.285
277. Id
278. See, e.g., Shriver v. McLennan County Children's Protective Servs., 610 S.W.2d 229
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ). The court in Shriver denied a motion to extend time
for filing of transcript. Id at 230. The court did not accept the attorney's explanation that
the transcript was being held pending the receipt from plaintiff of money to cover appeals
costs. Id Instead, the court found that the plaintiff's actions amounted to indifference or
negligence. Id
279. 605 S.W.2d 377, 380 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ).
280. Id at 380-81.
281. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.01-.03 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1982).
282. 616 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ granted).
283. Id at 701.
284. See, e.g., S.A.S. v. Catholic Family Servs., 613 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1981, no writ).
285. See In re B.B.F., 595 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1980, no writ);
Rogers v. Searle, 533 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi), rev'd on other grounds,
544 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. 1976). See also Solender, Family Law.- Parent and Child, Annual Sur-
vey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 133, 151 (1977).
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